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Comments
Administrative Law-Substantial Evidence on the.
Record Considered as a Whole
With the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act in
1946 and the Labor Management Relations Act in 1947 a prob-
lem arose as to the scope of review in cases where the courts of
appeals were called upon to determine whether evidence upon
which an administrative agency relied was substantial evidence.
The Wagner Act of 1935 had provided: "The findings of the
Board as to facts, if supported by evidence shall be conclusive."'
"Evidence" was interpreted to mean substantial evidence. 2 The
Labor Management Relations Act in 1947 amended the Wagner
Act to read, "the findings of the Board with respect to questions
of fact if supported by substantial evidence on the record con-
sidered as a whole shall . . . be conclusive." 3 Then the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act provided that a reviewing court "shall
. . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and
conclusions found to be ... unsupported by substantial evidence.
... In making the foregoing determinations the court shall review
the whole record or such portions thereof as may be cited by
any party." 4 The question arose in the court of appeals for the
second circuit as to whether review on the whole record required
that differences of opinion between an agency and its examiner
should be a factor in determination of substantiality of evidence. 5
Also, conflict of opinion arose among the circuit courts concern-
ing the process the courts should use in determining the substan-
tiality of evidence. One opinion was that the statutes were
intended to broaden the scope of review so that the appellate
1. Act of July 5, 1935, § 10(f), National Labor Relations Act § 10(f), 49
Stat. 449. 455 (1935), 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 (1947).
2. Washington, V. & M. Coach Co. v. Labor Board, 301 U.S. 142 (1937).
3. Labor Management Relations Act § 10(f) (1947), 61 Stat. 136, 148 (1947),
29 U.S.C.A. § 141 et seq., § 160(f) (1947).
4. 60 Stat. 237, 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C.A. § 1001 et seq., § 1009(e).
5. In National Labor Relations Board v. Universal Camera Corp., 179 F.
2d 749 (2d Cir. 1950), the court would not take into consideration the disagree-
ment between the board and examiner. In earlier decisions, other circuits
had considered such disagreement as a factor affecting the court's decision.
National Labor Relations Board v. Ohio Calcium Co., 133 F. 2d 721 (6th Cir.
1943); A. E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 117 F. 2d
868 (7th Cir. 1941); Wilson & Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 123 F.
2d 411 (8th Cir. 1941).
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courts should weigh the evidence pro and con.8 The other opinion
was that no change in the reviewing power was intended; 7 that
the appellate courts were to determine whether the evidence
upon which the agency relied was substantial when considered
in isolation-opposing evidence was to be ignored.
Both problems were answered in Universal Camera Corpora-
tion v. National Labor Relations Board.8 The case came from the
court of appeals for the second circuit,9 which was of the opinion
that the statutory requirement of reviewing evidence on the
record as a whole was not intended to broaden the scope of the
review. Appellants contended (1) that the court of appeals
erred in holding that the examiner's report which the board
rejected should be given no consideration in review of questions
of fact, and (2) that the board's order was not supported by
substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole. It
was held on the basis of Section 8b of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act 10 that an examiner's report is part of the record and
must be taken into consideration; therefore difference of opinion
between an agency and its examiner should be a factor in deter-
minfftin-6f substantiality of evidence. It was also held that the
statutory requirement of' reviewing on the whole record means
that the reviewing courts must consider the evidence pro and
con in determining its substantiality. "Whether or not it ,was
ever permissible for courts to determine the substantiality of
6. Pittsburg Steamship Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 180 F. 2d
731 (6th Cir. 1950).
7. The following courts of appeals agreed that no change was made in
the scope of review: National Labor Relations Board v. Universal Camera
Corp., 179 F. 2d 749 (2d Cir. 1950); Eastern Coal Corp. v. National Labor
Relations Board, 176 F. 2d 131 (4th Cir. 1949); National Labor Relations
Board v. Booker, 180 F. 2d 727 (5th Cir. 1950); National Labor Relations
Board v. LaSalle Steele Co., 178 F. 2d 829 (7th Cir. 1949); National Labor Rela-
tions Board v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 179 F. 2d 323 (8th Cir. 1950);
National Labor Relations Board v. Continental Oil Co., 179 F. 2d 552 (10th
Cir. 1950).
It appears that the practice of those circuit courts which before passage
of the Administrative Procedure Act and the Labor Management Relations
Act did not review on the whole record was justifiable on the basis of
Supreme Court decisions. Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. United States, 298 U.S. 349(1936); Federal Trade Commission v. Standard Ed. Soc., 302 U.S. 112 (1937);
National Labor Relations Board v. Link-Belt Co., 311 U.S. 584 (1941);
National Labor Relations Board v. Nevada Consol. Copper Corp., 316 U.S.
105 (1942); Interstate Commerce Commission v. City of Jersey City, 322 U.S.
503 (1944).
8. 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
9. 179 F. 2d 749 (2d Cir. 1950).
10. 60 Stat. 242 (1946), 5 U.S.C.A. § 1007(b). The court also held that
under the Labor Management Relations Act the examiner's report must be
considered as part of the record. 340 U.S. 474, 493. See Davis, Administrative
Law 316 (1951).
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evidence supporting a Labor Board decision merely on the basis
of evidence which in and of itself justified it, without taking into
account contradictory evidence or evidence from which con-
flicting inferences could be drawn, the new legislation definitely
precludes such a theory of review and bars its practice." "
However, in answering those questions, the decision gives
rise to other questions concerning the scope of review. It is the
purpose of this comment to discuss two rules governing judicial
review and to observe what effect the Universal Camera case has
upon those rules.
CmmrBILY
The first rule is the rule that the courts may not review the
credibility of witnesses. The courts must accept as final the
agency's findings of credibility. This rule was laid down by the
Supreme Court in National Labor Relations Board v. Link-Belt
Company and is well established in the decisions of the courts of
appeals.' 2 However, the Universal Camera opinion indicates that
in cases where an agency and its examiners differ on findings of
credibility the examiner's report may be reviewed by the courts
as to the credibility of testimony-a deviation from the prevail-
ing rule. Discussing legislative history which showed the signifi-
cance of examiners' reports, Justice Frankfurter quotes a Senate
committee which said the examiners' reports "would be of conse-
quence, for example, to the extent that material facts in any case
depend on the determination of credibility of witnesses as shown
by their demeanor or conduct at the hearing." 13 In further dis-
11. 340 U.S. 474, 487.
12. 311 U.S. 584 (1941). Accord, but perhaps dictum: Merchants Ware-
house Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 501 (1931). Credibility rule in the circuit
courts: National Labor Relations Board v. Bird Mach. Co., 161 F. 2d 589
(1st Cir. 1947); National Labor Relations Board v. Air Associates, Inc., 121
F. 2d 586 (2d Cir. 1941); Billik v. Berkshire, 154 F. 2d 493 (2d Cir. 1946);
National Labor Relations Board v. Geraldine Novelty Co., 173 F. 2d 14 (2d
Cir. 1949); Oughton v. National Labor Relations Board, 118 F. 2d 486 (3rd
Cir. 1941), cert. denied 315 U.S. 797 (1942); National Labor Relations Board v.
Standard Trouser Co., 162 F.2d 1012 (4th Cir. 1947); National Labor Rela-
tions Board v. Booker, 180 F. 2d 727 (5th Cir. 1950); National Labor Rela-
tions Board v. Texas Mining & Smelting Co., 117 F. 2d 86 (5th Cir, 1941);
National Labor Relations Board v. Ford, 170 F. 2d 735 (6th Cir. 1948); Supe-
rior Engraving Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 183 F. 2d 783 (7th
Cir. 1950); National Labor Relations Board v. May Department Stores Co.,
162 F. 2d 247 (8th Cir. 1947); Mansfield Journal Co. v. Federal Communica-
tions Commission, 180 F. 2d 28 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
13. 340 U.S. 474, 496. The same excerpt is quoted by the circuit court's
first opinion in National Labor Relations Board v. Universal Camera Corp.,
179 F. 2d 749, 752 (2d Cir. 1950). The circuit court seems to construe the
excerpt as bearing upon the significance which the examiner's report has
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cussion of examiners' reports as a factor in review of substanti-
ality of evidence it is said in the opinion, "We intend only to
recognize that evidence supporting a conclusion may be less sub-
stantial when an impartial, experienced examiner who has
observed the witnesses and lived with the case has drawn con-
clusions different from the Board's than when he has reached
the same conclusion." 14 And "the significance of his report, of
course, depends largely on the. importance of credibility in the
particular case." 15 Suppose a court reviewed a decision which
depended largely on credibility and decided that a difference of
opinion between an agency and its examiner concerning credi-
bility was an important enough factor to make the evidence less
than substantial support for the agency's decision. The agency's
decision would have to be set aside for lack of substantial evi-
dence. That would be reversing the agency on the actual ground
that the testimony was not credible. 16 This conclusion is borne
out in the history of the Universal Camera case in the court of
appeals.
The appellate court in its first opinion 17 set out the testi-
mony and noticed the conflicts. It noticed that the examiner
believed a certain important statement in the testimony and
that the board, disbelieving the statement, reversed the exam-
iner's finding of credibility. The court said that it agreed with
the examiner and would have liked to reverse the board's
reversal of the examiner. But because the court thought that
the difference between the board and its examiner could not be
included in the scope of the court's review, it accepted the find-
ing of the board that the testimony was not credible. The court
then considered the testimony which the board did believe and
concluded that, on the basis of the evidence which the board
believed, a reasonable person could have reached either the
board's conclusion or the opposite conclusion. Therefore the
to the agency. The Supreme Court seems to construe the excerpt as bearing
upon the significance which the examiner's report should have for the
appellate court.
14. 340 U.S. 474, 496.
15. Ibid.
16. The Supreme Court in its UniversaZ Camera opinion had said, "The
'substantial evidence' standard is not modified in any way when the Board
and its examiner disagree." 340 U.S. 474, 496. If the statement means that
the definition of substantial evidence will not change, it is correct. But if it
means that the scope of review in applying the substantial evidence rule
will not be broadened to include review of credibility, the statement seems
to be out of line with the holding of the case as to the significance of the
examiner's reports in affecting the substantiality of evidence.
17. 179 F. 2d 749 (2d Cir. 1950).
1952]
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court, within that area of difference, did not weigh the evidence
and sustained the board's decision of the case.
The Supreme Court held18 that the appellate court should
have taken into consideration the difference of opinion between
the board and its examiner on the issue of credibility. The case
was remanded and in its second opinion 9 the appellate court
discussed its consideration of the difference between the board
and its examiner. The court said, "... we cannot accept the
Board's argument that we are not in as good position as itself to
decide what witnesses were more likely to be telling the truth.
2..,, 0 Because it found nothing which made incredible the par-
ticular testimony upon which the board and examiner disagreed,
the court accepted that testimony as credible and reversed the
board's reversal of the examiner on that point.21 With that now
credited testimony added to the testimony that the board had
believed, the court found it could no longer uphold the board's
decision of the case. The court said, ".... we cannot escape the
conclusion that the record in the case at bar was such that the
finding of the examiner should have turned the scale." 22 Thus
the court of appeals' second decision of the Universal Camera
case is an example of reversal of an agency decision on the
actual ground that enough evidence was incredible to cause the
rest of the evidence to be less than substantial.
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE--REWMGING EVIDENCE
The second rule, the present status of which might be ques-
tioned in the light of the Universal Camera case is the jurispru-
dential rule that a court reviewing an administrative decision
must not reweigh the evidence.28 This rule is based on the theory
that the agency, not the court, is the fact-finding body. The rule
is a statement of how a court should not proceed in determining
whether evidence is substantial. In other words, the rule against
reweighing evidence is a limitation upon the application of the
substantial evidence rule. Therefore the rule against reweigh-
ing evidence must be considered in relation to the substantial
18. 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
19. 190 F. 2d 429 (2d Cir. 1951).
20. Id. at 480.
21. For a discussion of examiners' reports as a factor in appellate court
decisions see Davis, op. cit. supra note 10, at 316-317.
22. 190 F. 2d 429, 431 (2d Cir. 1951).
23. See cases cited supra note 7, 1 2. See also Davis, op. cit. supra note
10, 'at 916.
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evidence rule, which requires that an agency's findings of fact
must be supported by substantial evidence.
Facts, for the purposes of judicial review, can be divided
into two classes, primary, facts and ultimate facts. 24 Actually,
both kinds of facts are conclusions inferred from evidence. Hence
the ultimate facts found by an agency are the ultimate conclu-
sions inferred from evidence. Testimony and other evidence are
the proof from which the primary facts are inferred. Primary
facts are the proof from which ultimate facts are inferred.
The statutes never and the courts seldom use the terms
"primary facts" and "ultimate facts." They use the terms "evi-
dence" and "facts." The rule is that an agency's decision will
be set aside unless the "facts" are supported by substantial
"evidence." 25 Does this rule mean that the primary facts must
be supported by substantial evidence, or does it mean that the
ultimate facts must be substantially supported by the primary
facts? During the time that this rule was established the juris-
prudence was that a reviewing court could not review the credi-
bility of the testimony of the witnesses.20 If a reviewing court
may not decide whether or not testimony is credible, the court
is thereby prevented from deciding whether the testimony is
substantial evidence of the existence of a primary fact. There-
fore the word "evidence" as used by the courts cannot refer to
evidence (testimony) of the existence of primary facts. "Evi-
dence" must refer to primary facts. As a corollary the word
"facts" means ultimate facts. Hence it is fair to conclude that
the rule that the facts must be supported by substantial evi-
dence means that the ultimate facts must be supported by sub-
stantial primary facts.
Under this rule a reviewing court is required to determine
whether or not the primary facts amount to substantial evidence.
In order to ascertain their substantiality the court must weigh
24. The Supreme Court recognized two classes of facts in United States
v. Pierce Auto Lines, 327 U.S. 515 (1946) and in Colorado-Wyoming Gas Co.
v. Federal Power Commission, 324 U.S. 626 (1945). For a more minute analy-
sis see Saginaw Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission,
68 App. D.C. 282, 96 F. 2d 554, 559-560 (1938). See also Davis, op. cit. supra
note 10, at 531 et seq.
25. Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U.S.
197 (1938); Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940);
National Labor Relations Board v. Nevada Consol. Copper Corp., 316 U.S.
105 (1942); National Labor Relations Board v. Crompton-Highland Mills, 337
U.S. 217 (1949).
26. See note 12, supra.
1952]
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the primary facts. A court could not conclude whether or not
those facts were substantial without considering how much
weight they should be given, because substantiality is a quanti-
tative concept. As long as the substantial evidence rule has been
a part of the jurisprudence, the courts have consistently ruled
that the evidence must not be reweighed. Taken literally, the
substantial evidence rule and the rule against reweighing evi-
dence are in conflict. The substantial evidence rule does exist;
it is actually applied; and its application necessarily results in
reweighing evidence. Therefore, unless the rule against reweigh-
ing evidence has some meaning other than its literal meaning,
that rule is simply a fiction and cannot exist.
Actually it seems that the rule against reweighing evidence
does have other than a literal meaning. The rule is merely a
limitation upon the degree of precision with which a court should
measure the weight of evidence. Substantial evidence has been
defined to mean "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind27
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." 28 It has also
been defined as "enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a
refusal to direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to be
drawn from it is one of fact for the jury." 29 Thus, evidence is
substantial, and an administrative decision must be upheld,
when the evidence is sufficient to compel reasonable men to reach
the same conclusion as the agency. And the evidence is substan-
tial support for an administrative decision when it is such that
reasonable men might or might not reach the same conclusion
as the agency. It is within this latter area that the rule against
reweighing evidence can and does apply. 0 The rule against
27. For a discussion of the "reasonable man" test in judicial review of
administrative agency decisions, see Stason, "Substantial Evidence" in
Administrative Law, 89 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 1026, 1038 (1941).
28. Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U.S.
197 (1938).
29. National Labor Relations Board v. Columbian Enameling & Stamp-
ing Co., 306 U.S. 292 (1939).
30. National Labor Relations Board v. Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc.,
337 U.S. 217 (1949). In National Labor Relations Board v. Nevada Consol.
Copper Corp., the Court said, "if the findings of the Board are supported by
evidence the courts are not free to set them aside, 'even though the Board
could have drawn different inferences." 316 U.S. 105, 107 (1942). In the'
Universal Camera opinion the Supreme Court noticed that Congress by
requiring review on the record as a whole intended to preclude such deci-
sions as the Nevada Consolidated Copper case. However, the Court impliedly
Indicated that decisions such as the Nevada Consolidated Copper case are
inconsistent with review on the record as a whole, only in that they may be
construed to mean that the evidence on only one side of the record should
be considered by reviewing courts. The Court affirmed the rule against
reweighing evidence which admits of different reasonable conclusions, when
[VOL. XII
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reweighing evidence may be summarized thus: The court must,
as a practical necessity, reweigh the evidence to determine
whether or not the evidence has sufficient weight to compel
reasonable men to. reach the same conclusion as the agency, or
sufficient weight for reasonable men to differ among themselves
as to the conclusion. Once the court decides that the evidence
has sufficient weight to meet either of those conditions, the court
may weigh no further. Within the area wherein reasonable men
might differ among themselves, the agency's conclusion (which
depends upon what the agency finds to be the precise weight of
the evidence) 31 is final.
In the past some of the courts of appeals have interpreted
the rule against reweighing evidence to mean that those courts
were prohibited from weighing the evidence on one side of the
record against the opposing evidenceY.2 Such an interpretation
cannot stand in light of the Supreme Court's Universal Camera
opinion. 3 3 There are statements in the opinion which indicate a
recognition of the fact that the courts must weigh the evidence
pro and con in considering the whole record. Writing for the
majority, Justice Frankfurter uses the word "weight." "The
substantiality of evidence must take into account whatever in
the record fairly detracts from its weight." 34 Words equivalent
to "weight" are used in other parts of the opinion. "The Board's
findings are entitled to respect; but they must nonetheless be set
aside when the record before a Court of Appeals clearly pre-
cludes the Board's decision from being justified by a fair esti-
mate of the worth of the testimony of witnesses." 85 Is there any
difference between an "estimate of the worth" and an estimate
of the weight? Or is there any difference between estimating
the worth and weighing the worth? In declaring that an exam-
it said (speaking of the whole record requirement), "Nor does it mean that
even as to matters not requiring expertise a court may displace the Board's
choice between two fairly conflicting views, even though the court would
justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been before it
de novo." 340 U.S. 474, 488. To this extent National Labor Relations Board
v. Nevada Consol. Copper Corporation is, impliedly affirmed.
31. That is, the total impact of inferences drawn from primary facts on
the establishment of ultimate facts.
32. This interpretation of the rule was applied in Wilson & Company v.
National Labor Relations Board, 126 F. 2d 114 (7th Cir. 1942) and National
Labor Relations Board v. Standard Oil Co., 138 F. 2d 885 (2d Cir. 1943). Such
an interpretation is justifiable on the basis of the Supreme Court decisions
listed in note 7, paragraph 2, supra.
33. 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
34. Id. at 488.
35. Id. at 490.
1952)
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iner's report must be considered as a factor in determining sub-
stantiality of evidence, Justice Frankfurter wrote, "Nothing sug-
gests that reviewing courts should not give to the examiner's
report such probative force as it intrinsically commands." 86
Here "probative force" is equivalent to weight. Further in the
opinion Justice Frankfurter reverts to the word "weight," say-
ing, "We do not require that the examiner's findings be given
more weight than in reason and in the light of judicial experi-
ence they deserve." 87
From the foregoing it follows that in the future, as in the
past, the appellate courts must continue to weigh the evidence, to
the extent set out in the discussion above, to determine its sub-
stantiality. And if the appellate courts follow the ruling of the
Supreme Court in the Universal Camera case, those courts which
formerly considered the evidence on only one side of the record
must in the future weigh the evidence on one side of the record
against the evidence on the other side, and then weigh the evi-
dence to determine its substantiality. That is, they must weigh
the evidence tending to support the agency's conclusions against
the Weight of the evidence tending to negative the agency's con-
clusions; then in the light of their relative weights decide whether
the weight of the former is still sufficient to meet the definition
discussed above of substantial evidence.
CONCLUSIONS
The circuit courts of appeals must weigh the evidence to
determine substantiality of the evidence, but they may not
weigh the evidence in the area wherein reasonable men might
differ.
The circuit courts of appeals may review credibility of testi-
mony and reverse agency decisions on the actual ground that
the evidence is not credible, in cases where an agency and its
examiner disagreed as to, credibility of testimony.
The appellate courts should no longer consider themselves
constrained to render decisions such as Wilson Company v.
National Labor Relations Board"8 and National Labor Relations
Board v. Standard Oil Company, 9 wherein the courts rendered
admittedly unjust decisions because they reviewed only one side
36. Id. at 495.
37. Id. at 496.
38. 126 F. 2d 114 (7th Cir. 1942).
39. 138 F. 2d 885 (2d Cir. 1943).
[VOL. XII
1952] COMMENTS 299
of the record, ignoring opposing evidence. The policy which the
Universal Camera case is intended to sanction is expressed in the
Court's statement that "the Administrative Procedure Act and
the Taft-Hartley Act direct that courts must now assume more
responsibility for the reasonableness and fairness of Labor Board
decisions than some courts have shown in the past." 40 That
policy, of course, applies to all agencies subject to the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act.41
40. 340 U.S. 474, 490 (1951).
41. It may be observed that a theoretical difference has prevailed between
review of administrative agency decisions and review of district court deci-
sions. (See Davis, Administrative Law p. 914-915 [1951]). Whereas the find-
ings of fact made by an administrative agency are tested under the sub-
stantial evidence rule (within the limitation of the rule against reweighing
evidence), the findings of a district judge are tested under Rule 52 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. That rule provides that "Findings of fact
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the wit-
nesses." (Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. Rule 52 [1948].)
The Supreme Court has held that "A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed." (United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395
[1948]. Boh Bros. Constr. Co. v. Perry Heavy Haulers, 166 F. 2d 719 [5th Cir.
1948] held clear error must be based upon review of the whole record. In
accord with Gypsum case where "entire record" is included in definition of
"clearly erroneous." But see Fox River Paper Corp. v. United States, 165
F. 2d 639 [7th Cir. 1948] where it is said review should be restricted to con-
sideration of evidence on only one side of the record.) Under such a defini-
tion, the reviewing court may weigh evidence precisely; it may draw from
the primary facts the precise inferences of ultimate facts. However, merely
because the court may draw different inferences from those of the district
judge, the court need not reverse the judge's findings. (United States v.
National Association of Real Estate Boards, 339 U.S. 485, 495 [1950]. Colum-
bian Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Goldberg, 138 F. 2d 192 [6th Cir. 1943] held that
preponderance of evidence is not the test for "clearly erroneous" findings.)
But in view of the fact that in reviewing a judge's decision the court may
substitute judgment and draw its own inferences from the evidence (primary
facts), and in view of the fact that in reviewing an agency decision the court
is limited by the rule against reweighing evidence, it follows that in deter-
mining substantiality of evidence the court is less restricted in reviewing a
judge's findings of fact than an agency's findings.
As to findings of credibility, Rule 52 requires only that due regard be
given the judge's opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses. The
language of the rule is weak and literally would give the reviewing courts
broad power to review and reverse judges' findings of credibility. However,
the courts have restricted themselves in review of credibility, and judges'
findings of credibility have been given a large degree of finality. (For
example, United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U.S. 338 [1949]; Gates v..
Woods, 169 F. 2d 440 [4th Cir. 1948]; Beard v. Achenbach Memorial Hospital
Ass'n, 170 F. 2d 859 [10th Cir. 1948]; Ruud v. American Packing & Provision
Co., 177 F. 2d 538 [9th Cir. 1949].) The finality of a judge's findings of credi-
bility where he has observed the witnesses is about the same as was an
administrative agency's findings of credibility before the Universal Camera
case was decided. Since the Universal Camera case ruling, it seems that
district court findings of credibility are to have more finality than do
administrative findings of credibility in cases where an agency and its
examiner disagree. The district court findings are entitled to "due regard,"
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SUBSEQUENT CASES
In ]Radio Corporation of America v. United States42 the
Federal Communications Commission, prescribing standards for
transmission of color television, had adopted the transmission
system proposed by the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS)
and rejected the system proposed by Radio Corporation of Amer-
ica (RCA). RCA contended before the Supreme Court that the
district court failed to review the record as a whole in deter-
mining whether the commission's order was supported by sub-
stantial evidence. The Supreme Court said, "we are convinced
that the review already afforded did not fall short of that which
is required.... Both the majority and dissenting opinions show
a familiarity with RCA's basic contention (and the minor ones
as well) that could have come only from careful study of the
record as a whole." 48
The opinion of the district court 44 shows that the court did
consider the evidence on the whole record. Only the primary
facts tending to support the commission's decision to accept the
CBS system are mentioned in the opinion, but in a footnote the
court listed the commission's "basic findings" 45 (primary facts)
as to, the system proposed by plaintiff RCA and as to the system
proposed by defendant-intervenor CBS. Speaking of the findings
of the commission, the court said, "it is not contended in the main
that they are not supported by substantial evidence." 4 But in
view of the fact that the court set out the primary facts pro and
con, and the fact that the court rendered judgment, for the com-
mission, the decision can be construed as affirming the commis-
sion's decision as supported by substantial evidence, after actual
consideration of the whole record. The court also considered
arguments pro and con on the issue of continuing an order delay-
ing the effective date of the commission's order during appeal to
the Supreme Court.
The opinions rendered on the case of National Labor Rela-
tions Board v. Pittsburgh Steamship Company47 will be consid-
but actually are accorded almost complete finality. But administrative find-
ings of credibility in cases where the agency and examiner disagree are
entitled to whatever weight the reviewing court may think they reasonably
deserve in each case.
42. 341 U.S. 412 (1951).
43. Id. at 415.
44. 95 F. Supp. 660 (N.D. Ill. 1950).
45. Id. at 665.
46. Id. at 667.
47. In the Supreme Court's second decision on this case (340 U.S. 498
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ered in chronological order. The appellate court's first decision 8
denying enforcement of a board order because the court found
the examiner to be biased was reversed and remanded.49 In its
second opinion °5 0 the appellate court considered the evidence pro
and con on the record as a whole, and again refused to enforce
the board's order-this time on the ground that there was not
substantial evidence to, support the board's conclusions. The
Supreme Court in its second opinion51 approvingly recognized
the appellate court's review of the whole record and affirmed the
decision.
Speaking of the circuit court's review the Supreme Court
said, "The court painstakingly reviewed the record and unani-
mously concluded that the inferences on which the Board's
findings were based were so overborne by evidence calling for
contrary inferences that the findings of the Board could not,
on the consideration of the whole record, be deemed to be sup-
ported by 'substantial' evidence." 52 Thus the circuit court's sec-
ond decision of National Labor Relations Board v. Pittsburg
Steamship Company5 3 stands as an approved example of a review
of the record as a whole, in which it was found that opposing
evidence detracted so much from the weight of the evidence
upon which the board relied that the evidence for the board's
conclusion was less than substantial.
Thomas J. Poch6
Criminal Liability for Nonsupport of an
Illegitimate Child
With the passage of Act 164 of 1950, Article 74 of the Crim-
inal Code, which establishes criminal liability for the non-
support of a wife or child, was broadened to cover illegitimate
children. A provision was inserted to the effect that "Solely for
the purpose of determining the obligation to support the court
[1951)) handed down the same day the Court decided the Universal Camera
case, it was held that this case was controlled by the Universal Camera
decision. Therefore the case is discussed as being subsequent to the Universal
Camera case.
48. 167 F. 2d 126 (6th Cir. 1948).
49. 337 U.S. 656 (1949).
50. 180 F. 2d 731 (6th Cir. 1950).
51. 340 U.S. 498 (1951).
52. Id. at 502.
53. 180 F. 2d 731 (6th Cir. 1950).
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